

Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of)
Application of SBC Communications, Inc.,)
Pacific Bell Telephone Company, and)
Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc.)
For Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services)
in California)

WC Docket No. 02-306

SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION

OF WALTER W. WILLARD

ON BEHALF OF AT&T CORP.

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ON BEHALF OF AT&T CORP.**

1. My name is Walter W. Willard. I am the same Walter W. Willard who submitted a declaration on October 10, 2002 ("Willard Opening Decl."), and a reply declaration on November 4, 2002 ("Willard Reply Decl."), in this proceeding on behalf of AT&T Corp. My educational background, employment history, and current responsibilities are described in my Opening Declaration.

I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF DECLARATION

2. The purpose of this Supplemental Declaration is to respond to assertions made by Pacific in its Reply Comments, and to two *ex parte* letters filed by Pacific, concerning the deficiencies in its OSS that I described in my previous declarations. In particular, I will be responding to the Joint Reply Affidavit of Stephen D. Huston and Beth Lawson Regarding OSS ("Huston/Lawson Reply Aff."), and to *ex parte* letters that Pacific filed with this Commission on October 25 and November 13, 2002. I will also respond to the statements in Pacific's Reply Comments and in the Reply Affidavit of Eric D. Smith ("E. Smith Reply Aff.") regarding

Pacific's compliance with its local number portability obligations under Item 11 of the competitive checklist.¹

3. Pacific has failed to demonstrate that it provides the nondiscriminatory access to OSS required by the checklist. As discussed in Part II, Pacific's Reply Comments only confirm that Pacific fails to provide CLECs with nondiscriminatory access to alternative community names.

4. Pacific also has not provided CLECs with the assistance necessary for proper implementation and use of its OSS interfaces. As discussed in Part III, the documentation cited by Pacific in its Reply Comments illustrates the failure of Pacific to delineate clearly the roles of its Mechanized Customer Production Support Center ("MCPSC") and Local Service Center ("LSC") – thereby causing substantial confusion among CLECs as to which center they should contact for assistance with day-to-day problems. Furthermore, Pacific's attacks on the lack of training of AT&T's personnel, without even attempting to defend the competence of its own personnel at the MCPSC, are simply an attempt to divert the Commission's attention from the MCPSC's poor performance. Finally, as discussed in Part IV, Pacific has not rebutted AT&T's evidence that it has failed to provide an adequate test environment.

5. Pacific's Reply Comments also demonstrate that it cannot show that its OSS are operationally ready. As discussed in Part V, Pacific acknowledges that there is no

¹ See Reply Comments of SBC In Support of In-Region InterLATA Relief In California ("SBC Reply") at ii, 8-13, 18-20, 64-65; Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶¶ 4-52; E. Smith Reply Aff., ¶¶ 2-10; *ex parte* letter from Colin S. Stretch to Marlene H. Dortch, dated October 25, 2002 ("October 25 *ex parte*"); *ex parte* letter from Geoffrey M. Klineberg to Marlene H. Dortch, dated November 13, 2002 ("November 13 *ex parte*").

commercial data regarding the performance of its OSS in handling orders for the UNE platform submitted through the EDI ordering interface under its LSOG 5 release. The lack of such data is a critical deficiency in the Application, because CLECs providing service on a mass-market basis will use the EDI interface under the LSOG 5 release (which is the release implementing uniform interfaces in the SBC region).

6. Finally, as discussed in Part VI, Pacific's reply comments do not rebut the evidence that it has not met its number portability obligations under Item 11 of the competitive checklist. Although Pacific implemented a "mechanized NPAC check" on September 30, 2002, the "operational data" that Pacific purports to include provide no evidence that the new functionality is effective in preventing the unexpected outages that occurred under Pacific's preexisting, deficient manually-intensive processes. To the contrary, the experience of AT&T since September 30th indicates that unexpected outages are still occurring.

II. ACCESS TO ALTERNATIVE COMMUNITY NAMES

7. In response to AT&T's evidence that Pacific fails to provide nondiscriminatory access to information regarding alternative ("prestige") community names, Pacific asserts that AT&T's claim (1) was not raised in the state proceedings and therefore should be barred here; (2) "rests on a mischaracterization of the ordering process"; and (3) is "belied by AT&T's own success in creating listings for its end users that include such alternative community designations." SBC Reply at ii, 10. Pacific is wrong on all counts.

8. First, AT&T did not raise this problem as an issue in the state proceedings because, at the time it filed comments with the CPUC, AT&T was submitting only limited

volumes of UNE-P orders to Pacific – and order rejections due to the use of improper alternative community names were therefore limited in number and impact. AT&T only began offering residential service in California on a mass-market basis through the UNE-P in August 2002, which was the same month when parties were required to file their comments with the CPUC on the ALJ's recommended decision.

9. AT&T first raised the alternative community name issue with Pacific in a center-to-center call on August 1, 2002. Pacific responded that it would investigate the matter. Because the issue was still emerging, and the scope of the problem was yet unknown, AT&T did not discuss the issue in its August 2002 comments and reply comments on the ALJ's recommended decision. The seriousness of the problem became clear only when AT&T submitted substantial volumes of UNE-P orders in August and found that approximately 5.9 percent of those orders were rejected for "invalid community names." Willard Opening Decl., ¶ 15.

10. Second, Pacific's contention that AT&T's claim is based on a "mischaracterization" or "misunderstanding" of the ordering process is baseless. AT&T has always been fully aware that, under Pacific's processes, a CLEC is not *required* to provide a community name on an LSR when the customer is not changing its directory listing. *See* Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶ 27. AT&T's practices, however, call for the submission of a directory listing form (along with an end-user form) for each migration of a customer from Pacific to AT&T's UNE-P service. AT&T decided to adopt these practices in order to provide quality service to its customers and ensure the elimination of any erroneous or outdated information in the customer's current listing.

11. When a customer requests AT&T to provide service, AT&T asks the customer what directory listing it desires, and then submits the information provided by the customer on the directory listing ("DL") form to Pacific. This procedure enables AT&T to store in its databases the directory listing information that it submitted to Pacific. Equally important, the procedure ensures that the customer's directory listing is accurate, up-to-date, and a reflection of the customer's current preference. It also spares both the customer and AT&T the task of reviewing each part of the current directory listing and deciding which parts (if any) should be modified.

12. Because it submits a DL form for each UNE-P migration order, AT&T is required to include an alternative community name on that form if the customer desires that name on his or her directory listing. *Huston/Lawson Reply Aff.*, ¶ 23. Conversely, if the customer's current directory listing already includes an alternative community name, use of the "postal" community name on the form will result in a reject. As I indicated in my Opening Declaration, AT&T's orders have been rejected when the customer already has an alternative community name in its directory listing, but AT&T includes a postal community name on the DL form (as will occur, for example, when the customer provides AT&T only with the postal community name).

13. Attempting to minimize the significance of the rejections that AT&T is experiencing due to "invalid community names," Pacific asserts that its "investigation" found that AT&T received such rejections on only approximately 1.4 percent of the "unique UNE-P PONs" that AT&T submitted in August. Pacific further asserts that its "investigation" of all PONs submitted by AT&T during August found that 10 percent of the rejections were "the result

of AT&T input errors” – and the remainder were due to two “systems problems” which Pacific recently corrected (the inability of its Listings Gateway to read abbreviations for community names and the return of alternative community names, rather than postal community names, on Pacific’s pre-ordering interfaces).²

14. Pacific’s “investigation,” however, is entitled to no weight. Pacific provides no underlying data or other basis to support the percentages that it describes. Pacific does not even describe the AT&T “input errors” that it claims to be responsible for approximately 10 percent of the errors.

15. Third, Pacific’s argument that AT&T’s own orders have “proven” that CLECs have nondiscriminatory access to information regarding alternative community names borders on the frivolous. *See* SBC Reply at 10; Huston/Lawson Reply Decl., ¶ 23. Pacific bases its argument on its data showing that AT&T has “numerous” listings in the PB/NB region that use alternative community names, and more than half of those listings were ordered as part of a new or changed directory listing. *Id.*; SBC Reply at 10. Even if Pacific’s data are accurate, AT&T did not obtain the alternative community names because of adequate (much less nondiscriminatory) access to Pacific’s information on such names. AT&T obtained the names

² *See* Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶¶ 28-29. Pacific asserts that although CLECs must use an alternative community name on the DL form if the customer desires that name to appear in his or her directory listing, its business rules require CLECs to use the community name returned on the address validation query to populate the “CITY” field on the end-user (“EU”) form. Prior to October 15, 2002, the address validation function returned the end-user’s alternative community name (if available), rather than the postal community name. Because Pacific’s Listings Gateway edits the EU form for the end-user’s postal community name, the use of an alternative community name on an EU form would result in rejection of the order. *Id.*, ¶ 29. The “fix” that Pacific implemented on October 15 modified Pacific’s systems so that the address validation function in its pre-ordering interfaces would always return the postal community name of the customer. *Id.*, ¶ 30.

either because it managed to obtain them through Pacific's help desk – which is a cumbersome and unreasonable procedure³ – or because the customer happened to know the correct alternative community name when AT&T took his or her order.⁴ At most, AT&T's experience shows that the “catch-as-catch-can” approach that Pacific forces CLECs to follow can sometimes yield the correct alternative community name.

16. Pacific contends that it provides “ample information” regarding alternative community name through the “flat file” that it makes available to CLECs, and through the “Data Validation Files” link in its Enhanced Verigate interface. SBC Reply at 10; Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶¶ 20-22. The “flat file,” however, simply correlates particular communities to their alternative community name. It does not provide information that would enable a CLEC to determine whether a particular customer uses such a name in its directory listing. Moreover, the flat file lists only the abbreviations (not the full name) of each alternative community name, and such abbreviations may not be readily identifiable to the AT&T service representative. Finally, the flat file provides no meaningful information that would enable a CLEC to determine how community names are to be used and the business rules associated with community names.

³ As described in my Opening Declaration, an LSR rejected for an invalid community name can require up to two hours of manual labor before AT&T can obtain the alternative community name from the directory listings help desk and resubmit the LSR. In addition, Pacific does not provide toll-free numbers to these help desks. As a result, CLECs would be required to expend thousand of dollars in additional costs, and thousands of additional hours of labor, if they experienced thousands of such rejections and were required to contact the directory listings help desk to obtain the correct information. Willard Opening Decl., ¶ 16.

⁴ For example, a customer living in Los Angeles might advise the AT&T representative that he or she wanted Beverly Hills to be listed as the community name in his/her directory listing. If Beverly Hills turned out to be the alternative community name for the customer's postal address, and the AT&T representative entered Beverly Hills on the DL form, the order would not be rejected.

17. Notwithstanding Pacific's assertions, the "Data Validation Files" link in Enhanced Verigate does not compensate for the deficiencies in the flat file. *Id.*, ¶¶ 21-22. As Pacific acknowledges, this link is available only in Enhanced Verigate – not in Pacific's other pre-ordering interfaces. *Id.*, ¶ 21. AT&T, however, uses the CORBA interface for pre-ordering.

18. Pacific asserts that even if CLECs do not use Enhanced Verigate as their pre-ordering interface, they can "copy and transfer the flat file to a table or database within a CLEC's own system," and can copy and integrate the "community abbreviations file" available through the Data Validation link into their own pre-ordering interfaces. *Id.* This process, however, is vastly more complex and expensive for a CLEC than Pacific suggests. To take the actions described by Pacific, AT&T would be required to make a substantial modification to its existing systems (including building the necessary software code linkages to the data downloaded from the Data Validation link) and include the new tables with alternative community name information in its own applications. Furthermore, AT&T would be required to constantly maintain the data to keep it current – and that task could be performed only through constant review of the Data Validation link in Enhanced Verigate. This process would be extremely costly and time-consuming.

19. Pacific offers no justification for requiring CLECs to follow such a process, for there is none. There is no reason why Pacific cannot simply include the Data Validation link in all of its pre-ordering interfaces, including CORBA, rather than require CLECs to use two such interfaces if they do not use Enhanced Verigate. CLECs need the information available through the Data Validation link for ordering, regardless of which pre-ordering interface that they use. CLECs which, like AT&T, seek to provide service on a mass-

market basis prefer to use CORBA or EDI for pre-ordering because, unlike Enhanced Verigate, they are application-to-application interfaces that are integratable with ordering interfaces (and with the CLEC's own internal systems). Thus, even assuming that information regarding alternative community names is available in Enhanced Verigate, the limitation of the information to that interface constitutes a denial of nondiscriminatory access to users of CORBA and other application-to-application pre-ordering interfaces that Pacific provides.

20. Pacific also asserts that "information on the availability of alternative community names, including how to order them, is available at Section 4.13.2 of the CLEC Handbook White Pages User Guide." *Id.*, ¶ 23. This User Guide, however, assumes that a CLEC is familiar with the alternative community names, and includes only a few specific scenarios. Like Pacific's other documentation, it does not provide the information that a CLEC needs in order to understand these names and how they are used. A copy of Section 4.13.2 of the CLEC Handbook White Pages User Guide is attached hereto as Attachment 1.

21. Finally, Pacific overstates the case when it asserts that the recently-installed Directory Listing Inquiry function that it implemented in August 2002 gives CLECs "access to information about the community name an individual end user has chosen for his white pages directory listing." *Id.*, ¶ 24. That function is available only to CLECs using LSPOR 5.01. *Id.* It is not available to CLECs which, like AT&T, use LSPOR 2.5. It is unreasonable to expect a CLEC to convert its pre-ordering interface from LSPOR 2.50 to LSPOR 5.01 solely to use the Directory Listing Inquiry function, especially if the use of LSROR 2.5 otherwise meets the CLEC's business needs. Pacific should be making this functionality available on all versions

of its pre-ordering interfaces if (as Pacific suggests) the information that this function provides enables a CLEC to send accurate orders.

III. PACIFIC'S MECHANIZED CUSTOMER PRODUCTION SUPPORT CENTER

22. Pacific denies that it has created confusion among CLECs as to whether they should call its Mechanized Support Center ("MCPSC"), or its Local Service Center ("LSC"), to resolve particular problems. *Id.*, ¶¶ 5-10. Pacific also contends that the MCPSC renders adequate assistance to CLECs. *Id.*, ¶¶ 11-18. The "evidence" that Pacific presents on both issues, however, shows precisely the opposite.

23. Pacific, for example, asserts that the three Accessible Letters that I attached to my Opening Declaration "demonstrate that Pacific and SBC consistently have provided AT&T and other CLECs with clear definitions of the functions of its various support groups."⁵ These Accessible Letters, however, do no such thing. For example, Pacific asserts that "The very title of the new support group, the Mechanized Customer Production Support Center, sets it apart from the LSC, which has always been primarily associated with manual processes." Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶ 7 (emphasis in original). Yet, as Pacific acknowledges, its September 15, 2000, Accessible Letter states that CLECs with "inquiries regarding pre-ordering and/or ordering activity via an OSS" should contact the MCPSC. *Id.* That description encompasses not only mechanized, but also manual, functions.

24. Pacific also asserts that its draft Accessible Letter sent to CLECs in SWBT's region in August 2001, and the final version of that letter sent on February 26, 2002,

⁵ Huston/Lawson Reply Decl., ¶ 6; Willard Opening Decl., Atts. 3-5.

“clearly indicate[] the distinct roles and responsibilities of PN/NB’s LSC and the 13-State MCPSC.” *Id.*, ¶ 8. Pacific, however, cites no language in these letters that supports its point. Pacific has good reason not to do so, because the letters define the functions of the MCPSC so broadly that they include both mechanized and manual processes – even though Pacific now asserts that the LSC is “primarily associated with manual processes.”

25. For example, the February 26, 2002, Accessible Letter describes the MCPSC’s function as “handl[ing] issues related to systems and business processes in production,” including solving “problems getting orders through.” Willard Opening Decl., Att. 5 (Attachment at 1). Only in a few limited instances does the Letter suggest that a particular function of the MCPSC is limited to mechanized orders. The Letter does not limit the other stated functions or definitions of the MCPSC to mechanized processes.⁶ To the contrary, the Letter defines the MCPSC’s responsibilities to include assisting CLECs “with error code analysis for each application” – even though, according to the same letter, the LSC is responsible for handling manual rejects. *Id.*, Att. 5 (Attachment at 1, 3).

26. The description of the LSC’s functions in the February 26th Accessible Letter also fails to provide a clear explanation of the role of the LSC. For example, the Letter describes the mission of the LSC as “the central center where ordering and pre-ordering

⁶ For example, two MCPSC functions described in the February 26, 2002, Accessible Letter are “Arrange for re-transmission of mechanized responses” and “List of non-manual SORD edits center can respond to.” Willard Opening Decl., Att. 5 (Attachment at 1-2). But all of the other functions of the MCPSC are defined without any reference to mechanized or manual processes. The Letter states, *inter alia*, that the MCPSC “Provides business process support to CLECs using OSS applications for pre-order/order activity in the SBC regions,” “Assists CLECs with issues pertaining to process flows within the applications,” “Assists CLECs with questions that are specific to data fields within individual applications,” and “Trouble shoots for business rule accuracy and system defects for CLECs using SBC OSS applications.” *Id.*

request[s] are submitted, and processed prior to [the] due date.” *Id.*, Att. 5 (Attachment at 3). The Letter further states that the LSC handles “all firm order confirmation inquiries,” and that this function includes “questions about normally submitted *or mechanized* request,” and “completion, *manually or mechanically submitted order.*” *Id.*⁷ Although Pacific now states that the LSC handles “issues requiring manual processing” (Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶ 9), the Accessible Letter describes a range of functions for the LSC that go far beyond manual processing issues.⁸ The “Profile” of the MCPSC and the LSC in the CLEC Handbook, which Pacific includes in its reply comments, provides a virtually identical – and equally blurred – description of the roles of the two centers. *See* Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶ 7 & Att. A.⁹

27. In my previous testimony, I showed that the confusion which Pacific’s documentation has created for CLECs regarding the roles of the MCPSC and the LSC is illustrated by the inconsistent oral statements that Pacific has made to AT&T regarding this issue. Significantly, Pacific’s Reply Comments do not dispute my testimony that the MCPSC originally advised AT&T that it should always contact the LSC for the resolution of any problems that AT&T experienced in submitting LSRs, and that the MCPSC subsequently stated

⁷ In view of the Accessible Letter’s statement that the LSC handles all firm order confirmation inquiries “about normally submitted or mechanized request,” it is remarkable that Pacific contends that “there is not even a vague reference in Pacific’s documentation associating its LSC responsibilities with CLEC use of electronic interfaces for pre-order and order – other than manual fall out.” *See* Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶ 9.

⁸ *See id.*, Att. 5 (Attachment at 3) (LSC’s functions include verification of CSR information, reservation of “unique telephone numbers,” and handling of requests to verify the status of pending orders).

⁹ Although Pacific contends that billing is one of the functions handled by the LSC, neither the Accessible Letters attached to my Opening Declaration nor the “Profile” cited by Pacific lists billing as a function of the LSC. Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶ 9 & Att. A; Willard Opening Decl., Atts. 3-5.

(contrary to its earlier representation) that AT&T should always contact the MCPSC for such resolution, except in the case of manual rejections. *See* Willard Opening Decl., ¶ 26. Pacific again created confusion in late October, when its Account Manager advised AT&T to contact the IS Call Center for assistance in reserving telephone numbers when AT&T was using the CORBA pre-ordering interface. This statement was inconsistent with Pacific's own February 26, 2002 Accessible Letter. Willard Reply Decl., ¶ 14.

28. Since the parties filed their reply comments in this proceeding on November 4, MCPSC personnel have continued to make verbal assertions regarding the roles of Pacific's various centers that are at variance with SBC/Pacific's documentation. On November 21, 2002, AT&T called the MCPSC for assistance because it was receiving rejection notices for LSRs on which it had attempted to populate the yellow page heading ("YPH") field.¹⁰ AT&T contacted the MCPSC because the type of problem that it was experiencing fell within the responsibilities of the MCPSC described in Pacific's documentation. The MCPSC, however, advised AT&T that "the process had changed," and that AT&T should contact its OSS Account Manager – not the MCPSC – for assistance. Moreover, Pacific never advised AT&T of such a "change" before AT&T contacted the MCPSC on November 21.

29. Even leaving aside the confusion among the CLECs regarding its responsibilities and those of Pacific's other centers, the MCPSC has been inadequately staffed, insufficiently knowledgeable, and slow to respond. Willard Opening Decl., ¶¶ 26-29. In its

¹⁰ Although the LSRs were submitted to Ameritech (rather than to Pacific), SBC has described the MCPSC as a support group for all 13 of the States in its region – in contrast to the LSC, which SBC has described as specific to the Pacific Bell/Nevada Bell region. Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶ 5.

reply comments, Pacific does not even attempt to defend the adequacy of its staffing and training at the MCPSC. Instead, Pacific asserts that to the extent problems exist at the MCPSC, they are “in some measure the fault of AT&T, which has repeatedly directed calls to that center that are plainly inappropriate.” SBC Reply at 19. In response to AT&T’s evidence that MCPSC personnel are inadequately trained, Pacific merely responds that “in many cases, it is the AT&T service representatives placing calls to the MCPSC who lack the necessary training.”¹¹

30. Pacific’s “blame-the-victim” response totally fails to address the issue of the adequacy of the training that it provides to its own personnel. In any event, Pacific’s attempt to blame long call hold times and other problems at the MCPSC on AT&T, even in part, is baseless.

31. To support its claim that AT&T’s representatives are inadequately trained, Pacific offers only three anecdotes about calls by AT&T personnel and a summary of one day of calls by AT&T to the MCPSC. *See* Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶¶ 12, 15-17 & Atts. C, F-H. This “evidence” is plainly insufficient to support Pacific’s sweeping conclusions regarding the adequacy of the training of AT&T’s personnel. To the extent that they show that AT&T has “misdirected” calls to the “wrong” center, these incidents simply reflect the confusion that Pacific has caused among CLECs by its failure to delineate clearly the roles of its centers. For example, although Pacific asserts that several AT&T representatives have stated to it that AT&T provides instructions to its representatives to call the MCPSC (rather than the LSC) for manual

¹¹ Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶ 12. *See also id.*, ¶ 15 (“the real source of this confusion seems to be AT&T’s refusal to train its representatives in proper procedure for calling the centers”).

rejects, those “instructions” are based on the information that AT&T has received from Pacific personnel.¹²

32. Furthermore, Pacific’s previous conduct is inconsistent with its current assertion that the allegedly inadequate training of AT&T personnel has contributed to the deficiencies in the MCPSC’s performance and has been “an ongoing problem with AT&T.” Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶¶ 14-15. In November 2001, after AT&T complained about the poor performance of the MCPSC, Pacific acknowledged in a face-to-face meeting with AT&T that there were “staffing and training problems at the MCPSC.” At no time during that meeting did Pacific suggest that AT&T personnel had somehow contributed to the problem.

33. At a meeting that AT&T held with SBC in May 2002, SBC did assert that the long hold times and other deficiencies in the performance were occurring, in part, because AT&T personnel were not receiving adequate training regarding the proper SBC/Pacific center to contact for resolution of particular problems. In response, AT&T expressed its willingness to resolve any such training problems, and suggested that the parties use their regular center-to-center calls to discuss the issue in detail. AT&T further suggested that SBC ensure the participation of a representative of the MCPSC on the calls, so that AT&T personnel could

¹² See Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶ 14 & Att. E; Willard Reply Decl., ¶ 15 (describing the need for AT&T to revise its methods and procedures regarding contacts with Pacific’s centers each time it receives a different description of the MCPSC’s responsibilities from different Pacific personnel who should be knowledgeable about these responsibilities). For example, as described in the center-to-center issues log attached hereto as Attachment 2, AT&T was advised by the MCPSC to call the LSC for all California rejects, only to be told later that the LSC handles only manual rejects. See Attachment 2 at 7 (“AT&T/Pacific Bell CA UNE-P Center-to-Center Issues List”), discussion of Issue 4.

receive specific details of the “misrouted calls” and other issues that SBC attributed to the inadequate training of AT&T personnel.¹³

34. Even though AT&T suggested that SBC discuss the issue of alleged inadequate training of personnel with AT&T on the parties’ center-to-center calls, SBC has not done so. SBC’s statement that this issue has been “the subject of many center-to-center calls” is simply untrue. The logs of the carrier-to-carrier calls, for example, show that the MCPSC has never complained during the calls that AT&T is misdirecting a high volume of calls to the “wrong” center or that the problems of the MCPSC are caused (even in part) because AT&T representatives lack the necessary skills, training, or knowledge.¹⁴ Although SBC has ample opportunity to ensure that the center-to-center logs correctly reflect every issue that is has raised, it has not disputed the accuracy of the logs.¹⁵

35. As Pacific indicates, SBC and AT&T held another meeting on July 23, 2002, at which SBC distributed an analysis of a sample of trouble tickets received by the

¹³ The participants in center-to-center calls include representatives from the MCPSC, LSC, SBC Account Team for AT&T, AT&T’s work center, and AT&T’s Local Services and Access Management organization.

¹⁴ During center-to-center calls in recent months, SBC has raised the issue that AT&T representatives were committing errors by including the same name information in certain fields of the LSR. *See* Attachment 2 at 4-5 (“AT&T/Pacific CA UNE-P Center to Center Issues List”), discussion of Issue 10. However, SBC did not assert that this problem was due to inadequate training or lack of knowledge of AT&T personnel.

¹⁵ In addition to using center-to-center calls, SBC can raise any issue of inadequate training or experience of AT&T personnel by discussing it directly with AT&T’s Local Services and Access Management (“LSAM”) organization, which is responsible for interfacing with Pacific. As in the case of the center-to-center calls, however, SBC has not raised this issue with LSAM since the parties’ July 23rd meeting. Given its failure to raise the issue with this organization, Pacific’s attempt to cast this alleged “problem” as a major cause of the MCPSC’s inadequate performance rings hollow.

MCPSC as a result of AT&T's calls to the MCPSC, including a description of the percentage of such tickets purportedly due to "CLEC error." *Huston/Lawson Reply Aff.*, ¶ 13 & Att. D.

Although Pacific now patronizingly states that its analysis was "an attempt to educate AT&T and to eliminate unwarranted calls," the analysis itself simply listed the number and types of "CLEC errors," without even identifying the purchase order numbers ("PONs") that were involved. *Id.*¹⁶ Thus, when it received the analysis from SBC, AT&T responded that it would send the analysis to its ordering representatives but suggested that the analysis be discussed in detail during the parties' center-to-center calls, where AT&T representatives could participate. AT&T further requested that SBC be prepared to discuss on the calls the particular PONs that were involved. Pacific, however, did not discuss in subsequent carrier-to-carrier calls the particular PONs that it included in the analysis it provided to AT&T on July 23.

36. Pacific asserts that during the July 23rd meeting "an AT&T representative stated that its desktops were not equipped to use all of the tools that SBC has made available to the CLEC community, therefore AT&T representatives were unable to perform some of the pre-order functions necessary for AT&T to submit accurate mechanized transactions." *Id.*, ¶ 13. Contrary to the impression given by SBC, however, AT&T was not acknowledging that it had simply chosen not to take advantage of the "support tools" that SBC offers. *Id.*, ¶ 12 n.3. AT&T has not built these functionalities into its systems because doing so would be an enormously costly and time-consuming task that would disrupt its mechanized processes and reduce its efficiency.

¹⁶ The PONs discussed in SBC's analysis were for orders submitted by AT&T well before July 23. Most of the PONs did not involve California, where AT&T did not begin offering residential service through the UNE platform on a mass-market basis until August 12, 2002.

37. SBC has developed the various “support tools” that it cites only for some interfaces and for some versions of those interfaces. For example, the “support tools” that SBC cites include: (1) Enhanced Verigate for pre-ordering; (2) the Order Status and Provisioning Order Status “available to a CLEC using an LSPOR 5.00” and later versions of an application-to-application interface; and (3) the Directory Listing Inquiry Function that is “available with LSPOR 5.01.” *Id.* ¶ 13 n.6. AT&T, however, does not use Enhanced Verigate for pre-ordering; it uses CORBA. AT&T also does not use LSPOR 5.00 or 5.01; it uses LSPOR 2.5. Thus, to use SBC’s “support tools,” AT&T would be required to modify its systems so that it would be using two pre-ordering interfaces (Enhanced Verigate and CORBA) and three different LSPOR versions (2.5, 5.00, and 5.01). To accomplish this task, AT&T would be required to reconfigure the hundreds of workstations used by its service representatives (and designed for use with its own back-end systems) with the software necessary to support access to the additional interfaces and versions. In the case of the Sun workstations used by many AT&T personnel, the software needed to support access to the web-based Enhanced Verigate interface cannot even be supported. Finally, AT&T would be required to expend substantial time and resources to train its personnel to use additional interfaces and versions, particularly since the data appearing on each interface varies according to how it is presented.

38. Thus, AT&T was not acknowledging at the July 23rd meeting that it had simply failed to use the “support tools” cited by SBC. AT&T has consistently advised SBC that it *would* like to use these tools, but that their development would be enormously burdensome and expensive for AT&T because SBC has chosen to deploy them only on particular interfaces and versions. AT&T’s position has been that it would deploy these tools if SBC made them

available in each interface and for each LSPOR version – and that SBC should do so as part of its OSS obligations.

39. The MCPSC's poor performance bodes ill for the future, particularly because there are no performance measurements in place to monitor its performance and prevent "backsliding" once Pacific receives Section 271 authority. *See Willard Opening Decl.*, ¶ 32. Pacific argues that the concerns expressed by AT&T should be given no weight because "AT&T has had ample opportunity to request performance measurements for the MCPSC since it was established in October 2000, yet has only recently (October 16, 2002) done so."¹⁷ AT&T, however, raised the issue of performance measurements for the MCPSC when it had the first opportunity to do so. The collaborative review of the California PM Review collaborative proceeding was last held in early 2000. The current review began in June 2002. AT&T thus could not raise the issue of PMs for the MCPSC (which was established in November 2000) as part of the collaborative review until the current review began in June 2002.

40. As Pacific notes, AT&T first proposed a measure for the MCPSC the current California collaborative review on October 16, 2002. *Johnson Reply Aff.*, ¶ 57 n.48. Pacific suggests that AT&T deliberately delayed raising the issue either because it considered the issue unimportant or was simply raising it in anticipation of the imminent filing of Pacific's Application with this Commission. *Id.* AT&T, however, raised the lack of performance measurement for the MCPSC as a problem in filings with the CPUC in its Section 271 proceeding in July 2002.

¹⁷ *Huston/Lawson Reply Aff.*, ¶ 10. *See also SBC Reply at 20; Johnson Reply Aff.*, ¶ 57 n.48.

41. Furthermore, even AT&T's July 2002 filing was not the first occasion on which AT&T raised with SBC the issue of performance measurements governing the MCPSC. AT&T proposed such measurements on June 25, 2002, during the SBC/Southwestern Bell performance measurement review. SWBT, however, rejected AT&T's request at that time, and as a result AT&T raised this issue in the California 271 proceedings.

42. Thus, the record is clear that AT&T raised the issue of MCPSC performance measures (or the lack thereof) with SBC in June 2002 and in filings with the CPUC in July 2002. Moreover, Pacific's unfounded assertions concerning AT&T's purported delay in proposing performance measurements for the MCPSC cannot alter the fact that Pacific is not providing CLECs with the assistance that they need to use available OSS functions successfully.

IV. TEST ENVIRONMENT

43. As I have previously testified, the test environment offered by Pacific in California does not mirror the production environment, because: (1) the test environment does not allow CLECs to perform mechanized testing for accounts in Southern California; and (2) the test environment does not reflect the production environment that will exist when AT&T converts from LSOG 3.06 to LSOG 5, because it does not enable AT&T to test whether (as should be the case) AT&T will receive responses under LSOG 3.06 to orders sent under that version prior to the conversion to LSOG 5. Willard Opening Decl., ¶¶ 34-42. The failure of the test environment to mirror the production environment was further confirmed recently, when certain of AT&T's orders for migration of its customers from UNE platform to UNE loop service were rejected in actual production – even though, in the test environment, the same types of orders were successfully submitted, without rejection. Willard Reply Decl., ¶¶ 7-11.

44. Pacific asserts that AT&T “has now abandoned” the argument that it made before the CPUC that it could not adequately test any orders in the Southern region of California, and now “claims only that it cannot adequately test the two LATAs in California that overlap the Northern and Southern Regions.” Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶ 46. That is not the case. In my Opening Declaration, I specifically described the failure of the test environment to allow mechanized testing for accounts in Southern California as one of the reasons why the test environment does not mirror the production environment. Willard Opening Decl., ¶¶ 34, 37.

45. Pacific further contends that “AT&T is only complaining that it is unable to test the accuracy of its own internal tables for two LATAs.” Huston/Lawson Reply Decl. ¶ 46. This is a mischaracterization of AT&T’s claim. Because the data in AT&T’s tables are based on the business rules provided by Pacific, testing will determine not only whether the tables are correlating particular NPA/NXXs with the BAN that should be used, but whether the business rules of Pacific – from which those data were derived – are correct. In addition, AT&T needs testing to determine the validity of the internal tables or programs that Pacific uses in its own systems to correlate NPA/NXXs to particular BANS.¹⁸ Pacific’s internal tables or programs are integral to the Pacific business rules that CLECs are supposed to be able to test using the test environment. For example, if a CLEC submits an LSR in the test environment using the BAN called for by Pacific’s business rules, and the order is rejected on the ground that the BAN is incorrect, that fact would indicate that Pacific’s own systems are not correlating the BAN and the NPA/NXX correctly.

¹⁸ Although it has not specifically so advised the CLECs, Pacific undoubtedly has prepared electronic tables or programs of its own that review the NPA/NXX on a particular LSR and determine whether the LSR sets forth the “correct” BAN for that NPA/NXX.

46. Pacific contends that its test environment mirrors the production environment because AT&T “can be assured its table for [a particular] NPA/NXX is accurate” if it uses a Northern Region BAN and the order is not rejected – and, conversely, that a Southern region BAN should be used if the order is rejected. Huston/Lawson Reply Aff. ¶ 47. Pacific is incorrect. If AT&T submitted a test LSR for a particular NPA/NXX with a Northern region BAN and the order was not rejected, AT&T would be certain only that the BAN for the particular NPA/NXX on that order was correct. To arrive at the level of “assurance” described by Pacific, AT&T would be required to test every one of the 123 NPA/NXX combinations in the overlapping LATA in question.¹⁹ That would require AT&T to submit at least 123 test cases (one for each of the existing NPA/NXX combinations) – and, it appears unlikely that Pacific would allow AT&T to do so, because Pacific has complained in the past even when a CLEC has sought to submit 60 to 80 test cases.

47. Pacific also suggests that, contrary to my previous testimony, it is “not likely” that AT&T would need to conduct testing whenever AT&T updates or modifies its NPA/NXXs to ensure that Pacific has properly advised the CLECs as to which type of BANs (North or South) they should use with the NPA/NXXs.²⁰ However, changes to the BANs assigned to those NPA/NXXs *will* undoubtedly occur any time that new codes are opened in the 661 or 805 NPA’s.

48. Pacific’s suggestion that AT&T could simply rely on updates to the Local Exchange Routing Guide (“LERG”) is impracticable. *See* Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶ 48. The

¹⁹ *See* Willard Opening Decl., Att. 6 (listing 123 NPA/NXXs from overlapping LATA).

²⁰ *See* Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶ 48; Willard Opening Decl., ¶ 38.

LERG is an important tool in network interconnection trunk ordering and routing. However, CLECs do not use the LERG as a regular tool in ordering UNE-P, UNE loop, and LNP-type local exchange service products from Pacific and thus do not integrate the LERG into their processes for ordering these products. Pacific has offered no reason why, rather than require CLECs to connect monitoring of LERG updates to their internal processes, Pacific cannot simply publish its correlation of NPA/NXXs with BANs on its web site.

49. Pacific's suggestion that AT&T access the Enhanced Verigate User Guide "to determine what BAN should be used on an LSR" is equally unrealistic and unreasonable. *Id.* ¶ 49. As previously stated, AT&T does not use Verigate for submission of UNE-P orders to Pacific.

50. With respect to AT&T's inability to test whether orders sent under LSOG 3.06 will receive responses in that version even after AT&T converts to LSOG 5, Pacific responds that this "is not an issue that a CLEC would need to test in the test environment," because "the ability to receive an older version of notification is on the CLEC side of the interface and should not have changed in the process of updating its EDI interface to the specifications of the new version." *Huston/Lawson Reply Aff.* ¶ 51. Moreover, SBC asserts, AT&T can perform such testing by including this scenario in its own test plan or – if it does not want to "experiment" in this way – by "ask[ing] the OSS CLEC support group for possible ideas." *Id.*, ¶ 52.

51. Pacific's rationalizations simply demonstrate that the test environment is incapable of sending a response in an earlier version, and thus does not mirror the production environment. By suggesting that AT&T can "reflow[] a transaction to itself," or obtain ideas

from the OSS CLEC support group, Pacific is attempting to foist on the CLECs the burden of developing a method (such as building their own test environment) that will enable them to test these transactions outside the production environment.

52. In any event, Pacific's assertion that "nothing will change" on the CLEC's side in the process of updating its EDI interface to the specifications of LSOG 5 is factually wrong and highly misleading. Pacific has required that, in connection with the conversion to LSOG 5, CLECs change certain parameters of their connectivity to Pacific's OSS (such as EDI header information, including GS-02 and GS-07) to indicate the source of the transaction. Pacific has not required CLECs to change these parameters in connection with any previous version of EDI. Clearly, AT&T and other CLECs need to use the test environment to determine whether the modified connectivity parameters are correct. If the parameters are incorrect, AT&T may not receive firm order confirmations and other responses.

53. As I stated in my Reply Declaration, AT&T's recent experience in submitting orders to convert AT&T customers from the UNE platform to the UNE loop provides further confirmation that Pacific's test environment does not mirror its production environment. When AT&T submitted actual commercial orders for such migrations, they were rejected on the ground that the LSR contained a directory listing even though AT&T was not requesting a modification to that listing. Yet, when AT&T submitted the same types of migration orders in the test environment, they were accepted and processed by Pacific's systems. Willard Reply Decl., ¶ 9.

54. In a recent *ex parte* letter that it filed with the Commission, Pacific contends that the different results occurred because AT&T failed to submit a test case worksheet

indicating that it intended to submit UNE-P to UNE-L migration orders on lines with existing main directory listings – and that, if AT&T had provided such information, “Pacific would have loaded the test environment with appropriate directory information,” and the orders would have been rejected in the testing environment as well. November 13 *ex parte*, Att. at 5. As Pacific knows, this is untrue.

55. Contrary to Pacific’s assertions, AT&T *did* submit a test case worksheet clearly showing that it planned to submit a UNE-P to UNE-L migration order containing the customer’s existing main listing (which was not being modified). Attachment 3 hereto is the test plan as AT&T requested that the test environment be configured. The list of “UNE-L Test Cases” called for two UNE-P to UNE-L migration orders. Test 5.1 calls for a UNE-P to UNE-L migration of an existing customer with an existing directory listing. The result of that test was described as “PacBell LRDL (Loop Request with Port *and* DL).” Attachment 3, “Test Cases – UNE-L” at 6 (emphasis added). Pacific could only have understood this test case to involve a migration containing a directory listing that was not being modified, because the second UNE-P to UNE-L test case – Test 5.2 – expressly called for a *new* stand-alone directory listing order for a UNE-P to UNE-L migration. *Id.*

56. The test results that Pacific provided to AT&T in October 2002 also confirm Pacific’s understanding that AT&T’s test case worksheet provided for submission of a UNE-P to UNE-L migration order containing (but not modifying) an existing directory listing. These results, which are attached hereto as Attachment 4, include the original test spreadsheets as updated by Pacific during the testing. Like the original test plan, the results of Test 5.1 describe such a migration order, with the same entry of “PacBell LRDL (Loop Request with Port

and DL).” See Attachment 4, “Test Cases – UNE-L” at 7. And, like the original test plan, the results of separate Test Case 5.2 describe the processing of “a new Stand Alone directory listing order.” *Id.* Pacific not only described the results of both tests as “successful” upon retesting, but stated that it had changed the activity code (“ACTL”), telephone number (“TN”), service address (“SA”), and end-user (“EU”) for Test Case 5.1 (apparently because the ACTL, TN, SA, and EU that SBC originally supplied to AT&T for this test case was not valid for the scenario). *Id.*

57. During testing, Pacific never questioned that Test Case 5.1 called for anything other than a migration of a customer from UNE-P to UNE-L through an order containing an existing directory listing, and not requesting modification of that listing. That is because the test case, as described by AT&T, left no doubt about the matter. Pacific’s modification of certain data used in that test case, without questioning its scope, further shows that Pacific must have been fully aware of the scope of the test case and the conditions being tested.

58. Pacific claims that it has now implemented an “enhancement” to LSOR version 3.06 that will prevent rejections on this type of migration transaction “in either the production environment or the test environment.” November 13 *ex parte*, Att. at 5. It appears that Pacific made this enhancement, however, only in reaction to the discussion of AT&T’s experience in my November 4th Reply Declaration. Pacific’s “enhancement” became effective only on November 13 – the day Pacific filed its *ex parte* letter – and Pacific acknowledges that it “typically does not make enhancements to prior EDI versions.” *Id.* Indeed, only on November 11 did Pacific confirm to AT&T that it would make this “enhancement.”

59. Regardless of Pacific's motivation, however, the fact remains that its belated "enhancement" was not implemented until nearly two months after its Application was filed. It is my understanding that the sufficiency of the OSS must be determined in this proceeding as it existed at the time Pacific filed its Application. Even if consideration of the "enhancement" in this proceeding would otherwise be proper, Pacific cannot demonstrate at this point that it is effective, since it was implemented only two weeks ago. Although AT&T has experienced no rejections of UNE-P to UNE-L migration orders containing existing directory listings during the short period since the "enhancement" became effective, substantially more commercial experience will be required before it can meaningfully be determined whether the "enhancement" works as Pacific claims. The need for more data on the commercial experience of the new functionality is particularly important because, upon receiving Section 271 approval, Pacific will have little incentive to fix any deficiencies in the functionality or make any additional changes necessary to eliminate the order rejections that the functionality was supposedly designed to eliminate.

V. THE LACK OF OPERATIONAL READINESS OF PACIFIC'S OSS

60. Pacific's reply comments effectively acknowledge that no commercial data exists by which the Commission or the CLECs can meaningfully evaluate the performance of its OSS in handling UNE-P orders. Although Pacific describes the commercial volumes of UNE-P transactions submitted via the EDI interface between July and September 2002 (Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶ 37), Pacific expressly acknowledged in a previous *ex parte* letter that *none* of these EDI UNE-P orders were sent on LSOR 5.0.²¹

²¹ See AT&T Reply at 22-23; letter from Cynthia J. Mahowald (SBC) to Susan Wittenberg and

61. The absence of any data showing the actual performance of Pacific's OSS in handling UNE-P orders submitted via EDI and using the LSOG 5 release is a critical deficiency in Pacific's application. LSOG 5 is the most advanced release available to CLECs, the release that implements SBC's obligation to implement uniform interfaces, and therefore the release that SBC's most substantial competitors may be expected to use. The performance of the OSS in handling UNE-P orders submitted via the EDI interface under LSOG 5 is an essential component of the operational readiness of the OSS, because – as Pacific itself has stated – the release is “unprecedented” in size and scope, and affects “nearly all aspects of system design and development.”²²

62. Pacific suggests that commercial data showing the performance of its OSS in handling UNE-P orders submitted via the EDI interface using LSOG 5 is unnecessary, because: (1) CLECs have submitted thousands of UNE-P orders using its LEX ordering interface, and LASR (the Pacific system that has all the edits and business rules) does not distinguish an LSR based on the interface from which it was submitted; and (2) Nightfire used LSOG 5 in submitting UNE-P orders during its recent integration testing. Huston/Lawson Reply Decl., ¶¶ 36, 39-40, 43. Neither of these arguments withstands scrutiny.

Lauren Fishbein (DOJ), dated October 16, 2002, at 1 (attached to *ex parte* letter from Colin S. Stretch (Pacific) to Marlene H. Dortch, dated October 17, 2002). Although they do not make the same express admission as that in the previous *ex parte* letter, Pacific's Reply Comments make no claim that any UNE-P orders have been submitted via EDI by CLECs using LSOG 5. Instead, Pacific asserts only that UNE-P orders submitted via its LEX interface were created using LSOR version 5.00 or 5.01, and that Nightfire used the LSOR 5.00 version in its integration testing when it submitted UNE-P orders via the EDI interface. SBC Reply at 12-13; Huston/Lawson Reply Aff., ¶¶ 40, 43.

²² See Willard Opening Decl., ¶¶ 47-48; Huston/Lawson Aff., ¶¶ 256, 258.

63. Although LASR is common to both EDI and LEX, Pacific's reliance on LASR ignores fundamental differences between EDI and LEX. Unlike LEX, which is a proprietary GUI interface developed solely by Pacific, EDI is an application-to-application interface that must be developed jointly by Pacific and the CLEC. EDI coding and mapping must be performed on both sides of the interface – Pacific's and the CLEC's. In order for the EDI interface to work successfully, the CLEC must map input from Pacific's back-end systems to standard EDI specifications, taking into account any exceptions that Pacific has made to such specifications. Pacific, in turn, must translate the CLEC's EDI mapping into its own back-end systems. These complexities in coding and mapping EDI obviously do not exist with LEX.

64. Nor does Nightfire's testing compensate for the absence of data showing actual commercial experience in the submission of UNE-P orders via EDI using LSOG 5. Nightfire is not a real-life CLEC, but a software and services company. Saifullah Aff., ¶ 1. Moreover, as AT&T has previously described, Nightfire was not an independent third-party tester, but was retained directly by SBC. AT&T Reply at 23 n.70. Even leaving these flaws aside, Nightfire's test was too limited in scope to serve as a measure of the operational readiness of the OSS. Nightfire only conducted testing to determine whether the parsed data that Pacific returned in response to pre-ordering queries could be auto-populated onto CLEC orders without manual intervention. Although the integratability of pre-ordering and ordering functions is critically important to a CLEC's ability to compete, it is only one of many indicators of the operational readiness of the OSS.

**VI. PACIFIC'S FAILURE TO MEET ITS NUMBER PORTABILITY OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE CHECKLIST**

65. In its Reply Comments, Pacific states that it implemented a "mechanized NPAC check" on September 30. As part of its submission, Pacific attaches the "Supplemental Notice of Compliance" that it filed with the CPUC on November 1, purporting to provide 30 days of operational data for the new functionality. SBC Reply at 65; E. Smith Reply Aff., ¶¶ 8-9 & Att. A.

66. As I testified in my Reply Declaration, Pacific's implementation of the mechanized NPAC check is so recent that it is premature to conclude that the new functionality is inadequate. Pacific's "Supplemental Notice" provides no evidence that the functionality is successful, because the Notice includes no data regarding the occurrence and frequency of outages since the functionality was implemented. Willard Opening Decl., ¶ 83; Willard Reply Decl., ¶¶ 17-20.

67. In fact, the reliability of the mechanized NPAC check has already proven to be questionable. At the time I filed my Reply Declaration, AT&T's own internal data showed that 18 of its customers have experienced outages even though the LNP orders for those customers were processed under the mechanized NPAC check. *Id.*, ¶¶ 21-23. More recent data casts further doubt on the effectiveness of the mechanized NPAC check. For 35 LNP orders that AT&T submitted for AT&T Broadband customers between early October and November 15, 2002, the customer experienced loss of dial tone during the migration of its service to AT&T. AT&T has confirmed that these 35 outages were due to a deficiency in the new mechanized NPAC check. It is also my understanding that in October 2002 (the first full month the mechanized NPAC check was in operation), Pacific failed to meet the applicable benchmark for

Performance Measurement 15A (average time to restore for LNP). This failure, which is discussed in greater detail in the Joint Supplemental Declaration of Diane Toomey and Sarah DeYoung, is further indication that SBC has not borne its burden of proving that it has met its number portability obligations under the checklist.

68. Any outages experienced by customers, regardless of their number, are a serious problem because they inconvenience the customer and impair a CLEC's ability to maintain a reputation for providing quality service. *Id.* ¶ 22. Indeed, nine of the AT&T customers who experienced the outages due to problems with the mechanized NPAC check cancelled their service with AT&T and switched back to Pacific.

69. The implementation of an effective mechanized NPAC check is essential to prevent the types of outages that occurred under Pacific's preexisting manual processes when AT&T's customers called to cancel or reschedule an appointment on the day of the scheduled cutover. *See Willard Opening Decl.*, ¶¶ 62-82. In its Reply Comments, Pacific nonetheless defends its performance under the preexisting manual processes, accusing AT&T of "suggest[ing] that managing its operational difficulties in scheduling LNP conversions is somehow Pacific's responsibility." Pacific further asserts that "it is AT&T's responsibility to work with its customers to ensure that conversions take place as scheduled or are cancelled/rescheduled in a timely manner." *E. Smith Reply Aff.*, ¶ 6.


70. Pacific's assertion that the outages were due to AT&T's failure to adequately confirm and reconfirm appointments with its customers is the same false argument that it made two years ago in resisting AT&T's request for a mechanized NPAC check. *See Willard Opening Decl.*, ¶ 78. AT&T makes extensive efforts to ensure that customers

understand, and agree to, the originally-scheduled appointment times. After making the original appointment, AT&T attempts to follow up with the customer to ensure that the customer is aware of (and still agreeable to) the scheduled date and time. Despite these efforts, some customers cancel or reschedule on the day of the scheduled installation. These last-minute cancellations and reschedulings are a common occurrence over which AT&T has no control. *Id.*, ¶¶ 62-63, 78. Pacific was fully aware that such last-minute decisions are commonplace, but nonetheless insisted (until late September) on handling requests for cancellations or rescheduling by CLECs through a manually-intensive process that all but ensured that outages would occur. In short, the problems occurring under Pacific's previous processes were due to Pacific, not to AT&T.²³

²³ Pacific's reference to AT&T's "operational difficulties" also ignores the fact that CLECs seeking to provide service through loops or other facilities are at a disadvantage in comparison to Pacific and other ILECs. If a CLEC provides service through loops and other facilities, it must arrange for a dispatch, and schedule an appointment with the customer, every time it receives a request for installation of service. That is not the case with ILECs. For example, although an ILEC must dispatch a technician to provide service to a customer moving into a newly-built residence, a dispatch will not be required when a subsequent purchaser of that residence requests service from that ILEC. On a relative basis, therefore, the ILEC is not required to arrange installation dates and times as frequently as facilities-based CLECs.

I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on November 27, 2002

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Walter W. Willard', written over a horizontal line.

Walter W. Willard

ATTACHMENT 1

White Page Listings User Guide -

LSOR 05.x

**Pacific Bell/Nevada Bell
Industry Markets**

**Effective
February 23, 2002**

A complete physical address is required with new listing service for:

- Directory assignment
- Directory delivery
- NPA-NXX verification

Directory Delivery Address is also referred to as the DAD. The DAD is required when the subscriber requests directory delivery to an alternate address.

4.13.2 Synonym Community Name

A **Synonym Community** is a commonly referred to geographical neighborhood or prestige community. EUs who wish to be listed with a Synonym Community must enter the:

- Synonym Community as the Listed Address (LALOC).
- Actual corresponding Postal Community as the Service Address (SA) CITY.

Example: The EU resides in West Hollywood, which is not a valid Postal Community, but is a Synonym Community for Los Angeles.

LALOC = West Hollywood

CITY = Los Angeles

4.13.3 Street Thoroughfare

The word "Street" should be omitted from the street address in most cases.

"St" should only be used in the following three instances

- when the street name is the same as the community name,
 - when the street name is a number (e.g. "Second St"), and
 - when the street name is one of the four directional letters (e.g. "N St," "S St," "E St," and "W St").
- See LSOR 05.00 Appendix A for acceptable street thoroughfare (SATH, LATH, DDATH).